Lessons to be learned from the Arctic Sea Mystery by Candyce Kelshall BUCSIS Fellow and Maritime Security Expert

There are lessons to be learned from the Arctic Sea mystery. Are we paying attention?

Just when we feel smugly safe that we can lower our national alert status an incident occurs that ought to ensure we pause and reflect on the veracity of the safety we feel as we go about our daily business in Europe.

The mystery ‘pirate’ attack on a ship in Swedish waters at the end of July has quite rightly raised concerns about the fact that an act of ‘ piracy’ could occur in these waters. There is less discussion however, about the fact that the safety mechanisms and protective barriers we have in place in European ports, waterways and transit points have all failed in a spectacular manner.

 It is not the occurrence of the incident that should give us pause but the fact that a vessel which had allegedly been the subject of a criminal attack and assault and possibly had hijackers in command of it was able to pass through or near the territorial waters of Sweden, Poland, Germany, Denmark, Netherlands, UK, France, Spain and Portugal and not be challenged which ought to raise some serious concerns.

The Ship owners readily admit that the AIS tracker on the ship showed anomalies in the ship’s path that should have immediately alerted all parties concerned that something untoward had occurred on board. Indeed this is the very reason for the AIS system being introduced as part of the ISPS Code which the IMO championed and which has subsequently been adopted by almost every seagoing nation.

 Any deviation in a vessel’s track that is sufficiently beyond reasonable expectation demands that an interrogation of the unusual circumstances be undertaken immediately and resolved. The ship‘s course, speed, and direction were  recorded as erratic and sufficiently dramatic enough to indicate something highly unusual was taking place. Had this been an LNG tanker would our vigilance have been as complacent? Clearly AIS anomalies of this magnitude were not of concern at the time the Arctic Sea was attacked.

The attack was reported. The length of time taken for this report to filter through the various diplomatic and national security channels is worthy of attention. There is dispute that the vessel was actually even hijacked as consensus in informed circles implies that the vessel was not hijacked but allegedly subjected to a special forces raid. The Swedish police have confirmed that they did not raid the ship but acknowledged that they had received five reports of a suspicious small vessel in the area prior to the attack.

The 3998 ton freighter, a relatively small ship by International standards sparked one of the biggest hunts in European waters in living memory. The Russian Navy  command  ordered five ships and two nuclear submarines to search the Atlantic for the vessel. In fact it also ordered that all resources, including space and satellite technology be used to locate the ship. The UK added two submarines and a frigate to the search and Russia’s FSB, successor to the KGB, took up residence in the head office of the ship’s security company in Arkhangelsk and co-ordinated the investigation.

The vessel is Maltese flagged and consequently under the jurisdiction of Maltese law and the Maltese Maritime Domain Authority. Its crew is Russian, its cargo and agent Finnish and its regular run was between Finland and Algeria. Added to the complexity of the case is the fact that the boarding incident took place in Swedish waters making the Swedish police the agency responsible for the investigation. Curiously, it is Russia who took the lead in the search for the ship. “Under the orders of President Dimitry Medvedev, all Russian Navy ships in the Atlantic have been sent to join the search for the Arctic Sea,” Navy commander Vladimir Vysotsky said, Itar-Tass reported. An interesting consideration is the fact that the month previous the ship was recorded as being in Kaliningrad, Russia for an extended period of time.

Given the developments in the search for this vessel and the contradictory statements from all parties –one thing has emerged that we are certain of. This incident has highlighted how insecure our maritime borders are. Even with co-operation between sate agencies information sharing took almost two weeks . If the ship was carrying a cargo that is dangerous and unmanifested  then the ease with which it was able to penetrate our inner harbours and travel unimpeded along our coastlines, while under rogue command is a thought that demands addressing.

 If the ship was simply hijacked, again, this demands attention not regarding the matter of why it was hijacked or the fact that it was hijacked but regarding the fact that  the reporting and dissemination structures in place were clearly inadequate. New protocols are demanded by this scenario.What is more, even if it had been identified as a hijacked ship with rogue elements at the helm and it had hazardous cargo on board, and we challenged it in the Dover strait because we had been reliably informed it was approaching- what would we have done?

If the worse case scenario is a vessel getting into our protected harbours near our poulations- well,this was it. It did.  If the intent was to do harm then this is a case study of how it all might have gone wrong. The case is not straight forward;of that there is no question but the fundamental issues need addressing and urgently.

We simply cannot be in a situation where the agencies charged with allowing and monitoring passage through our most vulnerable  and sensitive waterway throw their hands up and say we didnt know.The MCA, incidentally is also the agency which believes that ship security officer qualifications should be restricted to watch keeping officers and not ex Royal navy or Royal Marines who could become part of ship’s crews as a designated security officer.

The fact  remains that protection by paper which is what the ISPS code amounts to if it is adopted by short cuts in order to save costs, will not protect our sea going crews and our vessels. Only proper training of ship’s crews and security plans which are enforced and operated regardless of port or anchorage 24 hours a day will stop incidents like these occuring. At the very least they give crews a chance to protect themselves and their cargoes and keep ships in the hands of those who legitimately operate them.

 

 

 

 

 

Candyce Kelshall on the Arctic Sea Mystery

 

The Arctic Sea: What are we Really Looking For? By Candyce Kelshall, BUCSIS Fellow and Maritime Security Expert

A vessel collected her cargo in Jakobstad Finland on 23^rd July. She proceeded underway until 24^th July when, at 3 am, she was boarded using maritime specialist tactics from a fast rigid inflatable boat marked “POLIS” by alleged police operatives who wore black special operations uniforms, knew hand to hand combat and who were intimate with the ship’s communications equipment and technology.

They stormed the bridge via the bridge wings and tied up the crew, beat the watch officer and duty watchman. The rest of the 15 man crew were also bought on the bridge and subjected to ‘hard questioning’ about the cargo and about drugs. They then smashed up the communication equipment and collected all mobile and satellite phones and left after twelve hours of rummaging.

This is the report the crew gave to the ship’s company. The ship’s operating company ‘Solichart’ interviewed each crew member and ascertained that there were injuries such as broken teeth and bruising which were subsequently reported.

The story then becomes complex. If these were pirates who were after financial gain they had succeeded as they had captured the cargo. If they were pirates who wanted a ship for ransom or terrorists securing a deadly or hazardous hidden cargo, it was theirs.  Instead, according to the company, they left with nothing but phones.

The ship delayed reporting the incident to the authorities, according to the company because its communications equipment was damaged. Yet the ship continued on its journey and without putting into port to make police reports and repairs, continued with its radios suddenly able to work in order for it to gain entry and pass through Dover without arousing suspicion. Once through Dover and into the Atlantic, just off Brest, its AIS ship tracker, mandatory in International Maritime law, was switched off. At that point all communication with the ship ceased. Or so we have been told.

If the hijackers were still on board and the radios and electronic equipment working how and why was the crew able to make contact with the ship’s company and report the incident? Surely the attackers, now in control of the vessel would not wish details to emerge. How and why was the ship able to communicate by email with Sweden’s National Criminal Police according to Swedish Daily Helsingin Sanomat quoting the Deputy Head of the Unit Tommy Hydfors. Surely hijackers in command of the vessel would not speak to the police unless complex negotiating was taking place.

If negotiating was taking place and communication was established then why is it that Coastal authorities were not aware of the ongoing live incident as it passed through their waters until after the fact. Interpol and Borderpol exist for these very reasons along with the myriad of agreements in place to share information of this nature for all our joint and mutual safety and protection- Europe has one border now. If this were the case then why was the AIS signal disrupted and radio and radar silence ensue only after clearing Dover? The equipment cannot have been damaged hence late reporting, but working, only to be damaged again after clearing the last checkpoint at Dover?

Clearly all the information relating to this incident is not what it seems. This becomes even more apparent when the escalation and urgency to find this vessel has taken on epic proportions. Russia seems utterly focused on finding this ship. Under the orders of President Dimitry Medvedev, all Russian Navy ships in the Atlantic have been sent to join the search for the Arctic Sea,” Navy commander Vladimir Vysotsky said, Itar-Tass reported. This is the same country which has been criticised in the past over sluggish attempts to save stricken sailors in a series of maritime mishaps beginning with the KIRSK in 2000, K159 in 2003 and Vepr in 2008. Its concern for the welfare of these sailors is to be noted as exceptional.

The question has to be asked however - is it in fact the crew that the entire Russian Navy in the Atlantic is currently searching for. If it is not, then what is it that someone went through great expense to equip, train, fund and hijack the vessel for? What is it that is so important that people are going to such dramatic lengths to retrieve, or keep, or stop from reaching its destination? We should be concerned.